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AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF HYBRID CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS IN LARGE 
FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA 
Vijaya Thyil*, Suzanne Young« 
Abstract 
The heightened pace of corporate governance reforms has focussed attention on country-specific 
governance models. Considerable debate has ensured as to whether the outsider Anglo-Saxon system 
or the insider Continental system is most applicable to India. This paper repOlts the results of a study 
of Indian governance which used a primary qualitative approach of twelve interviews of key executives 
of five large firms in 2008 as well as publicly available documents. A literature review establishes six 
key characteristics that distinguish the two major systems. The governance characteristics of the 
Indian firms are classified in terms of the two systems with a view to assessing the extent and nature of 
hybridization. TIle findings endorse the hybrid corporate governance system of India, clearly 
identifying similarities and differences to the two major governance models. In drawing on rich 
interview data, the paper delves into the national characterist ics of India that have influenced the 
hybrid model such as stewardship, corporate social responsibility and partnerships between the 
corporate and commu nity sectors. The evolution of the governance practices and the rationale for their 
existence are also examined. The paper demonstrates that the hybrid governance system has emanated 
from countly-specific culture including values and ideologies, and political orientation of socialism. 
The scope of this study was limited to large listed companies and business groups. Future research 
should use a larger and more diverse sample including private and unaffiliated firms fo r outcomes that 
can be generalized. 
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Introduction 
The heightened pace of corporate governance reforms 
in developing coun tries has focussed attention on 
country-specific governance models, with 
practit ioners and scholars attempting to understand 
the similarities and differences of the models. One 
clear indication from the country studies is that a 
mixed system of governance can emerge in 
developing countries (Afsharipour, 2009). For 
instance, Sarkar and Sarkar (2000: 168) observed that 
'based on some broad compar isons with the two main 
prototype govemance systems in the world, the Indian 
corporate governance system is by and large a hybrid 
of the' outsider systems' of the US and UK, and the 
'insider systems' of cont inental Europe and Japan'. 
Similarly, Dwivedi and Jain (2005) and Gollakota and 
Gupta (2006) have also found evidence of a home-
grown system in India. However, the extant IiteralUre 
discusses Indian governance from an overall 
evalua ti on of stock exchanges or large surveys and 
data sets (Chakrabarti, Megginson & Yadav, 2008; 
Ghosh, 200Gb; Gupta, 2005; Sarkar and SarkaI', 
2000). The problem with such data is their inability to 
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explain a behavioural phenomenon or practice. 
Alpaslall (2009) voiced this concern when he 
observed, 'when (t corporation accepts responsibility 
and accommodates stakeholders wishes it may not 
alwnys be easy to figure out the real inrcntions of the 
corporat ion' . This study seeks to bridge this gap in 
governance research. By using rich intervi ew data 
with key executives in large, established Indian 
businesses, it delves into the origins and rationale or 
the governance- system, the intentions in instituting 
the governance practices, and the cultural beliefs and 
assumptions 011 which the practices arc based. In 
doing so, it highlights the nature of Indian corporflte 
governance as a hybrid system and in particular 
explains the specific form this hybridization takes. 
Thus, the key contribution of this research is its 
tilliqueness in its approach 10 highlighting the 
characteristics of the Indian system and its 
cOl11lllonnlitics and differences to the two typically 
referred to systcms- namcly Anglo-Saxon systems 
and Continental systems. 
Furthermore, an cmpirical study of governancc 
issues in India, in particular, is thought to be 
imporlnnt due to India having a number of unique 
govcrnance issues (Jackling & Johl, 20(9). Not only 
in terms of governance practice, but also with regard 
to theory development, India and other developing 
countries offer tremendous opportunities (Judge, 
2009), making this study timcly and I'elevnllt. 
Particular governance charactcristics are evident in 
relation to ownership, board structures, role of stock 
exchange, role of banks and amount of n'ec float. For 
instance Allen ct al. (2007: 22), based on their sample 
of 2753 Indian nOll-financial finns, reported that 
controlling intcrests in about 78% of (he Indian firms 
reside with a particular individual or G1mily. 
However, pyrmniding, cross-holdings and non-public 
trusts mean that their governance structures are 
comp!ex and opaque (Jackling & Johl , 2(09). Hence, 
an analysis of' India's homc·~growJl, stylizcd 
governancc system will provide information for 
coun tries such as China and Germany and the South 
Asian region that have a large proportion of h11llily-
owned businesses. For these countries, the 
development ofa 'home-grown' governance system is 
a necessity. not a choice, ifgood governance is to take 
root (Jaffer & Sohail, 2007), Not only do [ndian firm, 
need to have an increased undcrstanding of their own 
practices, with globali7.ation, foreign multinationals 
doing business in India need to be aware orlhe Indian 
govcrnance system (Li & Nair, 2009). 
This paper provides empirical evidence of the 
corporate govcrnance systems in large businesses in 
India by exploring two types of data: one, the publicly 
(lwdlable da ta from the Indian stock exchanges and 
the company's annual reports, and two, the intcrview 
da ta from twelve key informants from fivc cstablished 
Indian businesses. It firstly reviews the literature in 
relation to the Anglo~Saxon and Continenta l 
governance models before discussing the 
characteristics of the Indian governance model. 11 thcn 
presents the methodology and subsequently the 
interview data ordered by case study organi S<1tions. 
The characteristics are classified in terms of the 
Anglo-Saxon and Continental systems with a view to 
assessing the extent and nature of hybriciiZc1tioll. The 
limitations of the study and future research needs arc 
also prescnted. 
Review of Literature 
The majo)' cO)'poral"e goveJ"nance systems 
Several scholars have articulated the key HSpccts of 
the main global corporate governance systems. One 
approach has been to scrutin ize the systems (l{ the 
level of counh'ies; and the other approach has been to 
examinc the systems at the level of firms. 
Weimer and Pape's (1999) taxonomy was based 
OJ) corporate governance systems at the level of 
countries. The authors delineated two market-oricrlled 
systems - the Anglo-Saxon and German ie, and two 
network-oriented systems - Latin and Japanese, based 
on a set of discernible and easily obtained data. The 
variables used were: 
• the prevailing concept of the finn in 
terms of whether it WaS oriented to 
independent shareholders who exercised 
control through the external stock market, or 
whether several groups of oligarchic 
stakeholders influenced decision-making; 
• whether the board had a single ticr 
with both executive and supervisory 
responsibilities 01' whether there was a dual 
structure; 
• whether the shares wcre widely held 
or concentrated in the hands of a few; 
• whethcr the stock Jll(trket 
importance was high or low based on two 
indicators used by the World Federation of 
Exchanges; 
• whethcr the external market was 
active; 
• the cxtent to which executive 
compensation was dependent on corporate 
performance; and 
• the time horizon of economic 
relationships. 
Accordingly, Anglo-Saxon systems were 
shareholder-oriented, exhibited singl e-ticr boards, 
accorded high importance to Ihe economy's stock 
market and hence had an active external market and 
focused on short-term relationships. In contrast, a 
Continental system with its cross-shareholdings and 
inter-locking directorships exhibited long-term 
relationships, a stakeholder orientation, relatively 
less-widely held shares and accorded a low 
importance to the stock market. 
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In 200 I, Nestor and Thompson distinguished the 
'outsider' system, or market-based system, from the 
Continental system or ' insider ' system. Accordingly. 
the 'outsider' systcm is characterised by a lega l and 
regulatory approach based on the assumption that the 
dispersed body of' investors who own the compuny 
need to be protected. Thus, this system 'presumcs 
ample disclosure of information, strict trading rules 
and liquid stock markets' (p. 23). In contrast, in the 
'insider' system, ownership and control is relatively 
11lore closely held. Thus, the dispersal of ownership is 
low with fewer agency problems in comparison to the 
'outsider' systcm. 
Garre!t (2004: 2) distinguished the governance 
systems as falling along H "rules-based" versus 
"principle-based" continuum as follows: 
A simple explanation of the difference 
between the two approaches is illustrated by 
the different concepts conveyed by the terms 
"law" and "guideline". The result is a 
different mindsel with respect to corporate 
governance in the United States, which 
applies a rule- or law-based approach, where 
what is not prohibited is permitted, compared 
to a principles-based approach where greater 
discretion is vested in a company's 
management to make decisions regarding 
governance activities. A principles-based 
approach to governance is one ill which 
guidelines are clear, but compliance with 
them is voluntary. 
Thus, the rules-based system is more common in 
countries that adopt the Anglo-Saxon system, while 
companies relying on principles arc more ollen 
regarded as operating within the Continental system. 
Although there are national di (ferences with countries 
such as UK, Canada and Australia classified as 
principles-based within an Anglo model. 
Of' those who investigated the firm-level 
governal)ce systems, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
fOllnd that finns in the USA and the UK rely 
substantially on an extensive system of rules 10 
protect investors, including minority rights, which 
allows for an easy transfer of' shares, with power 
provided to shareholders for class-Hction suits or to 
sue directors for violations of fiduciary duty. Eighty 
percent of large US publicly traded firms' shares arc 
widely held, that is, defined as having ' no single 
shareholder in control of 20% of the votin g righ ts', 
with the remaining 20% controlled by families, and 
none controlled by another widely held corporation 
(Ryan, 2(05). Moreover, the influence of trade unions 
is much less when compared with the COlltinen tal 
model. In contrast, firms in Europe and Japan have 
less reliance on elaborate legal protectioJ}s and more 
reliance on large investors and banks (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). 
Cernat (2004) introduced the terms 'capitaJ-
related' aspects and 'Iabour-rctated' m;pccts to 
differentiate the systems, and argued that the 
Continental model led to a more secure economic 
environment. allowing flnns to seek higher profits in 
the long-term as banks are represen ted 011 the Board 
of Directors, as opposed to the shorH erm view 
imposed by the stock markels 0 11 Anglo-Saxon 
companies. Furthermore, he reported that' n'ce 110at is 
limited and dividends less prioritized than in the 
Anglo-Saxon system' which meant that the 
shareholders did not face the classic Hirshmanian 
choice of 'voice or cxit '. Accordingly. less fluid stock 
markets make exit more costly. and, therefore, 
shareholders have a strong incentive to gain a 
powerful 'voice' in the management of the firm 
(Cern at, 2004: 154). Morek and Steier (2005) called 
this domination by the banks, 'bank capitalism', and 
observed that errant managers could be forced back 
into order by the banks that could withhold credit and 
starve the misgoverned firm of capital. However, the 
authors cautioned that bank capitalism or the 
Continental system, would allocate capital efficiently 
only if the bankers were altruistic and competent, and 
would create significant problems for the firms if lhe 
hanks arc themselves misgovellled. 
From the brief review of the major governance 
systems provided above, it is apparent that two 
models dominate, namely, the AngloRSnxon model 
and the Continental model albeit with some national 
idiosyncrasies. The distinguishing features of both 
models are summarized in Figure I. 
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Figure 1: Two Major Corporate Governance Systems 
Anglo-Saxon Corporate 
Governance 
System 
-Outsider 
-Market-based 
CONTROL MECHANISM: 
Enforcement of Regulations 
Legal and Regulatory 
approach 
Importance of stock market ~ High 
Extensive disclosures 
Strict trading rules 
Liquid stock markets 
Application ofthe key features in the 
Indian Governance system 
Strength (~lthe Legal System: 
The Anglo-Saxon governance system seeks to protect 
shareholders through a multitude of laws and 
regulations. The decision criterion for whether Indian 
governance fits the anglo model is the evidence of 
mandatory legal rules, regulations and codes for the 
governance of companies. The governance system 
also needs to demonstrate enforcement of the 
regulations. Givcn India's tradition of English 
common law and a dcmocratic political system (Li & 
Nair, 2009), one would expect Indian corporate 
governance to adhere more closely to the Anglo-
Saxon system. Ghosh (2006) observed that the 
Companies Act in India in 1956, and the series of 
Continental Corporate 
Governance 
System 
-Insider 
CONTROL MECHANISM: 
Strength of Relationships 
Stakeholder focus 
Single large shareholder or 
Oligarchic stakeholders 
.~... ----J Long-term due to Cross-
shareholding & Interlocking 
Directorships 
Fewer agency porblems 
t~ Principles-based approach ---J~~~~~ 
Importance of stock market" Low 
Less fluid slack markets 
Exit is costly 
Limited free float 
Banks represented on Board 
amendments to it have ensured that the 'interests of 
shareholders and creditors are protected and that 
shareholder voicc is adequately represented in the 
management of companies' (p. 3). Indeed the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBl) has 
been continuously enhancing the corporate 
governance standards in India. 111 October 2002 it 
constituted a Committee of corporate governance 
under the chairmanship of Narayana Murthy, the then 
Chairman of Infosys Technology. Based on the 
committee's recommendations and public c0111mcnts, 
several revisions were made to the standards. In its 
final version termed Clause 49 which was issued in 
October 2004 and requiring compliance by December 
2005, it bccamc mandatory for listed firtns to adopt a 
formal code of conduct, require their CEO and CFO 
to certify the financial statements, enhance disclosures 
, .' VIRTusf NjF.RrR,,'.~g 
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to shareholders especially on related party 
transactions and proceeds from public or rights and 
preferential issues, strengthen the responsibilities of 
the audit committee and amend the composition of the 
board with respect to the number of indepen<lcnt 
directors (lor detail s on C lause 49 sec SEI3l, 2004). 
World Bank's (2004: I) Wor ld Bank's 
Corporate Governance Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (CG ROSC) lor India provided 
an update on the regulatory fi"amework. It noted: 
Since rhe ./irst COIjJorafe Governance ROSe 
assessmeJ1l dated July 31, 200(), a series of 
legal and regula/VI)' rejimns have 
/ran.\formed the Indian cO'1JOra/e 
governance jiwneltlork and improved the 
level (?f l'e.\jJonsibilily!accolll7faMlity of 
insiden', jf.lirness in/he treatment a/minority 
shareholders and stakeholders, board 
practices, and /ramparency. 71lese are 
positive drivers qf chaJ1ge. 
Importance of the Srock Malietto the I!.conomy: 
Weimcr & Pape ( 1999) cite franks and Mayer ( 1990: 
209) who observed , in their study of capita l markets, 
regulation and corporate ownership, that an increased 
focus on rules and regulations would result in the 
stock market being accorded a prominent role in the 
economy. Their argument was premised on the 
principle of 'equa l access to information and 
protection of small investors fi'om exploitation by 
dominant shareholders'. Thus, an Anglo-Saxon 
governance system with its dominance of regulations 
would demonstrate a prominent stock market and 
enhanced market control. 
The decision va riable for gauging the 
importance of the stock market is thc Market 
Capitalization of Dom~<;tic Compan ies (MCDC) as (l 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GOP). This is 
in line with the usage by olher researchers (sec 
Weimer & Papc, 1999). The Indian economy is 
compared with USA, Austra lia and selected European 
exchanges to highlight the relative degree of stock 
market prominence. The MCOC data is reported 
annually by the World FcdcrHtion of Stock Exchangcs 
(in US$ millions) and GDP is reported annua lly by 
the World Bank (also in US$ mill ions). The 111000 ... t 
reccnt data available 011 GDP is for 2007, so the 
comparative figures for MCDC were also taken ror 
2007, However, since a single (lDP figure is not 
reported for Europe, selected exchanges and 
economics in Europe have been used. 
Table J prescnts the score on 'im portance or the 
stock market' for various economics. Thc score is 
depicted in column 5 of the table and allows uS to 
intcrpret the relati vc ran k or placement of the 
economy on the Anglo-Saxon versus Continental 
continuum. India, with its tradition of rules, as 
discussed earlier, is expected to accord a high 
importance to the stock market. However we see fl.·om 
Table 1 thai the MCDC as a percentage or GDP is 
155% for India in compari son to 177% for the 
Americas and 125% for the Spanish Exchange. 
Table 1. Importance oflhe stock market in Australia , lndia, Europe and USA 
MCDC (USD GDP (USD MCDC "sa 
millions) End millions) percentage or Rank in 2007 End 2007 GDP 
terms of Stock Exchange End 2007 importance 
Economy 
Swiss Exchange 1,271,047.7 Switzerland 424,367 300% I 
Americas - total 24,3 20,319.8 USA 13,75 1,400 177% 2 
region 
Australian Stock 1,298,3 15.0 Australia 820,974 158% 3 
Exchange 
Bombay Stock 1,8 19,100.5 India 1,176,890 155% 4 
Exchange 
London SE 3,851,705 .9 yt' '2\J12,024 139% 5 I . 
BME Spanish 1,799,834.0 Spain I ,~3 6,89'1 125% 6 
Excllangcs ( 
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Presence lind Degree of Influence oj (l large 
shareholder: 
In a Continental system, one specific shareholder 
or a large shareholdcr can oftcn be identified who 
exerts a substantial influence on managerial decision-
making. It is usually either a domestic or forci gll 
promoter. The decision criterion as 10 whether the 
g~vel.·mHl cc S.ylclll would be categorised as Anglo or 
Contmcnlal IS the presencc of this OI1C significant 
~llareholder, with 'signi ficant ' defined as 'ownersllip 
nltcrcsts greater than 20%'. This cut-off point is well 
acknowledged by other researchers (La Porta et 
al. ,1999: 57; Ryan, 2005). In contrast, the absen ce of 
one sped {ic large shareholder would indicate that the 
governance system is Anglo-Saxon. Thus, while the 
Con tinental system accords a high level of power to 
the controlling shareholder, the Anglo~Saxon system 
accords power for the managers as the stock 
ownership is dispersed. India, with its tradit ion of 
fi.un ily-bascd I!rms with high promoter holdings 
means that olle would expect the Indian corporate 
governance to adhere more closely to the Continental 
system. 
Extent ()/ Free Flom: 
0n~lo~Saxon markets arc characterized as being 
very hqUld, whereas the Contin ental system results in 
less liqu idi ty. As Berghe (2002) observed, the first 
reason for the low liquidity of the insider systems is 
the concentrated owncrship and the resultant low free 
(loat, while the second reason relates to the l onger~ 
term perspecti ve of the average shareholders. 111 
eomparison~ liquidity in the US markets is higher, due 
to the relatively short-term. investment horizon and 
lhe signi Jlc<-lnt role of the day traders. The de~ision 
criterion i'or <high' liTe Ooat is a 'free 110at fac tor 
greater than 55%'. This usage ora cut-off point in the 
range of 50% - 60% is in line with other scholars 
(Chong & Lopez-dc-Silanes, 2007: 233; Kaserer & 
Wagner, 2004: 14) . The free noat factor for the Indian 
listed companies is reported by the Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE, 2009) MUl11bai . BSE defines rrec 
float as ' th e p roportion of tola l shares isslied by th e 
company whIch arc readily available for trading ill the 
Illarket. It generally excludes prorllotcrs' holdings. 
government holdings, stra tegic holdings and other 
locked~ill shares, which will not C0111e into the market 
ror trading in the llormal course' (BSE, 2009). It is a 
Slandardized calculation and updated data is available 
in the Business Standard publication. As Biswal 
(n. d.a.) nOles, 'the available free~noat in most 
Am.crican companies is above 90 percent wh~rca~, ill 
India, ~rOl.noler~ hav~ m?~e thap a 59 percept stake tn 
thc maJo.nty of the. I~rgc: cOl1wani.es" ·, w11ich mean$ 
that one woutd ,ex-pcet ·thcr-ln'd~lil fii·nls ,to axhibit \e1.'S 
n:ee float than in"the USA:. ;' . .'1 · • ., • 
. . ' . . . 
'. : ..,: ~:/<q)~ pl;~i dj.;7(~·:;i6v·~Jj(lI1k~ .: " .' 
! ... ... , \ .. . . . ... . .. , . ... . . ','i .. . ," ' , •. 
, :"' :.!.:[i.l~ .  A.nglo~.Sa.~·6;n;Y~tel11 ~~xhibi ts a I~w level of 
cootl'\)1 ;·by: batiks, 'oli l 'the Board~ , of flnils. The 
. \\ ~ ':·r ~.\' ,\ it .. '.:\:~( '.il) , ., ' . ~ ., ·1' 
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percentage of equity ownership by banks provided ill 
[he 'shareholding pattern' data provides an 
assessment of the extent of control. In the Continental 
system, the level of ownership is higher in 
comparison to the Anglo~Saxon system. Ghosh's 
(2007) study on the extent of bank debt in Indian 
finns revealed that large firms had neg\igible bank 
debt and, hence. fewer or no nominees on Ihe Board. 
ThLlS, for the purposes of this study which uses large 
firms, one would expect the role of banks to be low. 
Strue/lire oj (he Bourd oj Directors: 
. Anglo-Saxon systems generally have a singlc-
tlcr board, composed of Executive (inside) and 110n -
Executive (outside) members, with both categories of 
members appoin ted and dismissed by shareholders. 
The median number of directors is 12 (sec Hanson & 
Song. 2000: 62), in comparison to the Continen tal 
system where there arc fewer directors. Continental 
systems ha~e a two-tier board classed as managerial 
and supervisory. Anglo boards arc also comprised of 
more independent directors compared to cont inental 
systems of governance. The decision cri terion is 'the 
number of members on the Board', 'number of tiers 
v~sible in the Board', and the 'number of independent 
directors', as presented in the Annual Reporls. In 
l~)dia, .the traditional board structure has been single.-
tlef With SEBI proposing a two-tier structure for the 
Public Sector Undertakings (PSU' s) only in June 
2005 (sec Subramanyan, 2005). This was confirmed 
by the World Bank's Corporate Governance Report 
on the Observance of Standards and Codes (CCi 
ROSe) Country Assessment or India in 2004, which 
observed that Indian firms have a 'unitary board 
structure' (p. 12). Therefore, it is expected that Indian 
firm s would exhibit a sing le-tie r structure with a 
higher number ofindependcnt di rectors. ' 
Methodology 
To explore these characteristics a multiple case study 
approach was used . The sampling method used 
purposive sampling to locate well~established fi nns 
listed on both the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and 
the National Stock Exchange (NSE) in India, which 
provides [or the interviewees to rcOcct on the 
evolution of their corporate governance practices over 
time. This selection of established firms is ill line with 
other studies (see Khanna & Palepu, 2000). 
The selection of intcrviewees was bascd on 
~xpert sampling and ensured Ihal more [han one key 
~!lfonnant was available from each finn to provide 
~l1ult.ple perspectives of the finn. Executives working 
111 . the .area o[ Corporate Governance, andlor 
Corporale Soei ~) Responsibility. (£SR) , and/or . as 
C;:orp~f~te . .s.ocr~~.cs r. ·~)·~ 'CO/ti.ilCtcd : fl't.~lbugh\ ci~l~jl 
and.an ap1101J\tme!H{S~~hllfl) dhclfr.office) ,~ . )- ~ , ~) ( , 
.. !. lYcGordling!'y.,;. wiUt· etli{t { bxc·epiioiL.~o£!.;dn~· i'ri;·j\.~ 
~hi'Ch .had Ol}ly cue i\l{llr\"lFe\vbe.;~~'.aHablc!: ihe"".O:(hcr 
four fir.ms ,had\ tW~Qr 11ldr~·;.the'l-in~r dftta ~sC( .(,'01;··sjsL~ 
of twe~)lc in-depth) intclvi~~ n·.(;m\.' live· bUSinesses 
" ... '. 
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·' .. r, . 
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operating in Ihe oil, slcel, aluminium and texti le 
machinery industrics. 
The face-to-face interviews, which lasled close 
to two hours cClch, were conducted over three weeks 
it) July 2008 in the companies' offices in India, A 
semi -structured interview schedule was used ill to 
elicit the responses. Qucslions were fi·amed to elicit 
responses iI'om the respondents as to their definitions 
of governance, what it meant, how it evolved, and 
what Were the key influences. The interviews were 
conducted by one of the authors and digitally 
recorded and transcribed. The typed transcripts were 
scnt to lilc interviewees for veri1ication. None of the 
interviewees made any changes to the transcript they 
receivcd. The study adhered to the National Health 
and Medical Research COllneil (NHRMC) Elhics 
guidelines. 
This research uses intcrpretivism which 'stresses 
Ihe subjcclivc aspects of human activity by focusi ng 
on the meaning rather (han mC<tsurcmcnt of social 
phenomena' (Hussey & Hussey, 1997:53). II claims 
that social phenomena arc not open to direct 
obscrvalion as per the positivists, but are only 
accessible via the interpretations of individuals find 
groups, with those involved thus assigning meaning, 
sign ificance or value (Porter, 1998: 14-5). The 
interpretive paradigm is morc appropriate in situations 
where the researcher is aUcmpting to study real-life 
experiences by participation in order to better 
understand and express its values, details and features 
(Healy & Perry, 2000: 119). It is the prererred 
paradigm when dealing with complex social 
phenomena involving reflective people who make 
choices in the real world, with the choices Ihemsclves 
being contingent upon the environment (Healy & 
Perry, 2000: 120). Thus, interpretation examines th e 
way people think and act, and assumes that bias is 
removed by accurately describing the meanings and 
interpretations ofparticipallts. 
Publicly available data n·om the World Bank 
(World Bank ROSC 2004), Government or India 
business portal, the BSE website, the Business 
Standard publication and the businesses' Annual 
Reports were llsed alongside the interview data to 
provide the context for the interview data and to 
interpret the interview data. 
For instance, whilst the interviews provided 
information on the regulations thaI the firm was 
complying with, the Government of India's busincss 
porlal was lIsed to double-check the name and content 
of the regubllions, the date it was introduced and the 
scope oflheir application. Similarly, the Jinns' annual 
reports were used to collect data regarding slock 
ownership, dispersal of equ ity ownership, including 
ownership by banks, membership on the Board of 
Directors, and the structure or the Board. 
Furthermore, the economy specific data was collected 
from the World Bank and the World Federation of 
Siock Exchanges. 
The comprehensive case data of each finn was 
Llsed to classify the 1irm's governance practice as 
Anglo-Saxon, Continental, or a mix of both 
governance systems (Hybrid). 
The sample respondents from five firms, their 
designations, and the codes used to identify lhem in 
the paper, are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Interview respondents and codes used 
Nnme of the finn nl'spondl'nt Code used in p'lper 
Oileo Chairman and Managing Director CMD 
Oileo Executive Assistant to Chairman and MD EA 
Oileo Manager Marketing Research, Planning and Analysis MM 
Slecleo 1 Vicc-President, Corporate Affilirs VI' 
Steeleo I Assistant Company Secretary ACS 
Sleeleo I Financial Controller of a Division FC 
Sleelco 2 Joint Managing Director JMD 
Sleeleo 2 Assistant Vice-President Finance AVI' 
Steeleo 2 General M;:magcr Human Resources GMHR 
Aluminiumco Company Secretary and Head - Legal CSL 
Aluminiumco Associate CSR Manager CSR 
Tcxlilcmachineryco Company Secretary CS 
CO/pomle OwnCfsfiip r:l Cont.ro[ / ((-Mione 8, Issue 1, (Farr 2010, Continued - 4 
Data and Findings 
Case I: Oi1co Oilco is a large Public Sector 
Undertaking (PSU) engaged in the oil industry. Based 
ill North India, its annual turnover in the most recent 
fiscal year was USS25,OOO million. It began 
operations in the 1950s, and since then has entered 
into mergers with {c)ttr organisations. A review of the 
firm's annual reports and the key informant 
interviews with the Board members and employees 
demonstrate that its corporate governance has been 
evolving since the time of its establishment in the 
early 1990s. Three key executives were interviewed in 
this company, the Chairman/Managing Director, his 
Executive Assistant and the Manager Marketing 
Research, Planning and Analysis. 
~ileo's annual rcport addresses shareholders 
rather than including other stakeholders .. In the 2008 
financial year, it had a two-tier board with II 
directors, 5 of whom were executive directors 
including the Chairman, 2 were non~executive 
government directors, and 4 were non~executjve 
independent directors (p. 126), The shareilolding 
pattern reveals that the Government of India holds 
51,11 %, Ibreign institutional investors (FIls) and 
overseas corporate bodies (OClls) hold 13.23%, 
banks hold 0.12%, employees hold 0.12%, and others 
hold 10.49% of the total shares of 338,627,250 
(company websitc). Thus, bank ownership is very 
low. ~ileo's frec float was 48.89% (Business 
Standard, 2009). 
CMD points out that a key driver of corporate 
governance, especially the PSUs has been India's 
socialist history and value systems. 'From the 
beginning lvlwl1 the public sector started, Nehru 
[India's /irst Prime Minister ./awaharlal Nehru} had 
a fundamental beli(f about being vel)) tramparent 
because, he said if was public money that was getting 
invested.fhr the public sector, and the management q/ 
{he public .vec!or is ac{ua/~)I the cllstodian q/ the 
public money and is ans1,-verable to the Parliament q/ 
India which it represented. So, over a period (~/{ime, 
rules and regulations evolved in such a way that 
/ransparcJ1(Y was in-built in governance '. 
MM confirms this view and also points out that 
the firm's governance embeds corporate social 
responsibility. 'As a public sector we have always 
heen having 0111' re.\p011.<.;ibilities towards' the socie~v 
at large. As a government COll1p(ll~V, that is what HI€ 
have alwcU'S been doing. CO/po rate governance as a 
law, as a rule, has come in later, and yes, we became 
more aware of what cOllJorate governance is. 
Otherwise it (wx"ial responsibility) is an in-buill 
thing which the company has been doing'. 
CMD adds that thc principle of stcwardship was 
also f()lIowed by large private sector business houses. 
'Even in the private sector, there were companies like 
the Tata's, the Gocirej, a number of those old Pars; 
companies ... they always had a velY transparent way 
(~/ doing business ./1'0111 the start. 111e Tata's have 
always had a reputation .fbr hO!1e.s'~~I, 
straigh(/orwardncss and even the currel1f 
Chairman, Raton Tata, makes it vel)' clear that Ihey 
are not here to make a huge prqfil. Bul, at Ihe same 
lime they do make profits '. 
This value based approach to governance and its 
link to regulatory oversight is further evident f)'om his 
comments on Oileo's compliance status when SEBl 
introduced Clause 49 Compliance, a corporate 
governance regulation, 'When Clause 49 )vas 
introduced wefound out that barring one or {H'O items 
we were actlla/~)I practising all (?/them ... For ins/once, 
H·'e have always had an audit cOlnm;t{ee. So, when 
Clause 49 came in, it was ea.\y for us. We had to 
/imnalize the committee in {he ./brm q/ a lefler; that 
was all we had 10 do '. 
From the governance perspective, the i()CUS was 
on stakeholders rather than shareholders. As MM 
reminisces, 'In 1994, that was the time \V€ suddenly 
realised Ihat there is someone ca!led a shareholder 
and we need to take care qf his interests as well. 
Until then, predominal1f~V 'rl'e had been looking at the 
society, taking care of the people or the public '. EA's 
comment defines 'stakeholders' quite broadly and 
aids in highlighting how CSR came to be embedded 
in the Indian governance system. 'The stakeholders 
are not just your employees or (he vendors but also 
the public who are residing around the factol)) or 
premises " 
In applying principles CMD spoke of the 
importance of non-discrimination and transparency 
although adding the problematic nature of corruption 
in Indian society. CMD explains, 'what actual~)) it 
(corporate governance) rneans to us is that a) 
transparency, b) that \ve do not dislinguish in terms (d" 
caste, religion, language when H'e do business, ./01' 
our employees or for 0/11' customers, () unless it 
happens accidentally, we normally don't cheat 
people '. Furthermore, 'the pCI./ormance appraisal is 
vel)' lransparent. The employee can see what is 
wrilfen '. However, he hastens to add that it does not 
mean that his finn is lice of corruption. 'There is 
ahi'Clys some pelty corruplion. We cannot escape.fi"om 
the socie~v in which we live, because 'what is an 
organisation? It is a microcosm q/the socie~v that H'e 
live in. So whatever ills in socie~v are there, some 
./orm or the other will happen here. We cannot 
eliminate that. But, we can mitigate il l~v pulfing in 
various interventions '. I-Ie cautions that smaller 
private firms exist who arc focused only on profits 
and 'are out there to cheat the government '. 
Do the firms benefit from the principles based 
approach? As eMD observes, 'transparency brings us 
a lot of happiness and at the end of the day it is also ({ 
good business decision. People are co}}?/hrrab/e doing 
business with liS. My company is known./or its vollies 
and transparency. That's the reason that we get some 
q/the best companies in the world as partners. 7Jwt 
makes us feel all the more that belfer governance is' 
good business '. 
, " 
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Case 2: Steelco 1. Stecko I is onc of the oldest 
integrated steel companies in India and manufactures 
and markets steel, steel building and construction 
applications. It was established in the early 1900s in 
India, and today its operations span the globe. Its 
corporate governance system was firmly established 
by its founders and was formalized in the 1990s when 
the corporate governance agenda was discussed in the 
public forum. Steeleo J is part of a large, diversified, 
fhmily-based group consisting of J 3 listed companies. 
Based in North India, the global conglomerate derives 
61 % of its revenues 11'OIn international operations and 
is reported to have US$62.79 billion in total revenues. 
Its (otal market cap was USS41.7 billion in June 2009. 
Three key executives were interviewed in this 
company; Vice-President, Corporate Affairs, 
Assistant Company Secretary and Financial 
Controllcr ofa Division. 
Steelco 1 's annual report addresses only 
shareholders and the Chairman's statement begins 
'Dear Shareholders'. In the 2009 financial year, the 
Board of Directors was two-tiered with the Executive 
Committee and a Joint Executive Committee, 
alongside a third committee speci fically for a main 
division of the company. It was comprised of J 4 
directors, of which 8 were independent. It had a non-
Executive Chairman, and the non-executivc directors 
made up more than 50% of the total number of 
directors. The shareholding pattcrn reveals that 
promoters, including family and group companies, 
hold 33.95%), foreign institutional investors (FIls) 
hold J 3.20%, banks hold 19.82%, and the general 
public owns 24% of the total shares of 730,592,471 
(company website). Thus, banks are among the three 
major institutional investors along with the FIls and 
the Mutual Funds/Unit Trust of India. Steelco l's free 
noat was 66.05% (Business Standard, 2009). 
As with Oilco, the linking of governance and 
CSR were fundamental to Steelcol's philosophy and 
vision, and was put in place by the founder. As 
observed by ACS, 'COllJOrate governance in Steelco} 
has been a vel)! importan! aspect ql running the 
a/jelirs ql the company. Basicalz)" in the Stee/col 
groups, it will seem the cOllJorate governance is also 
the philosophy of the company ... Our vishm says that 
we will take all steps for value creation, and safeO! 
and environment, people, and to protect the interest ql 
all the stakeholders ... It was the vision and the beli(f 
ql the founders. They always fel! that what comes 
jl-om the people should go back to them, many more 
times than what we get from them. It was a sort of 
we(jewe measure wherein they wanted the people to be 
not on~;1 working in the/fxtolY bllf also el?ioying their 
personal lile and then a decent community. So, a lot 
q( commwli(j' we(fare activities were done '. 
Hel' colleague, vr, affirms the principles based 
approach and adds that even the code of conduct was 
similarly a part of the philosophy and practice and 
was simply formalizcd decades later. 'It (the code of 
conduct) was firs! handwritten and we allfollowed il. 
There were no documents. In 1996 we formal()1 
documented if '. 
The data reveals that the 100 year old company 
had institutionalized best practice governance fh)111 
the 1940s bascd on valucs and principles, rather than 
regulation. In fact, the practices fbllowed by this 
company became mandated by legislation sevcral 
years later, when the Government of India realized the 
bcnefits of such governance standards. 
ACS describes how their practices led the way 
for legislation. 'The many facilities which we are 
(dlering to the shareholdel:\', we \vere doing this 
without thinking about regulations ... Even right fi'om 
{he earZF 90's (lY011 see, we had so IIW}~l' practices 
which were not sort (?f'laid down on a legislative 
level . ... like the 8 hour working, the l11aterni~v leave 
provision, the provident .limd and the bonus, which 
subsequently the government realized are vel)' 
important employee we(fclre activities. And, that '.'I' 
how the legislations were founded. It (our prac/ice.\~ 
was the origin qf' several legislations like the 
Factories Act, the Provident Fund Act, the Payment C?f' 
Bonus Ac!, the MaternUy Leave Provision. Steelcol 
I'vas already having some of the committees like the 
audit committee which have been subsequently made 
mandatOl), by the Clause 49. We had set U up in 1986 
whereas the legislation came in 2()O}. Again, take the 
whistle blower policy. At Steelco} we have had (he 
policy and it has been made mandatGl)!. We also have 
an e!hics counsellor and an etMcs commirtee '. She 
points out that the Clause 49 regulation and 
compliancc in its current form states the whistle 
blower policy as 'optional'. 
Due to its exemplary standards, Stecleo 1 has 
been a role model for several businesses in India. This 
has been corroborated by Oilco in their interview data 
above, where they mentioned some of the firms for 
their excellent governance standards. 
However, the introduction of legislation docs not 
mean that the standards will became pervasive. Its 
implementation is critical and as observed by ACS, 
the Indian govcrnance system is lagging on this fhmt. 
'If' you legislate but you dOI1 '{ monitor, then thal 
legislation becomes a piece q(paper. So it lacks teeth. 
SEEI is the watchdog. But it lacks teeth. It cannot 
pursue, il cannot prosecute or take any aclion against 
the (~fJending companies '. Thus, she adds that despite 
the strict Clause 49 compliance, some firms 'might 
fu(fll it in terms C?( the substance hut not in the true 
.spirit '. 
Case 3: Steelc() 2. Like Stcelco 1, Steeleo 2 is 
also part of a large, diversified, family-based group 
with interests in manufacturing and marketing steel, 
energy and infi'astructure and logistics. The business 
group was established in 1982, and incorporated its 
steel business in South India in 1992. Stee\co 2 
reported annual revenue of INR.1706430 lakhs 
(approximately US$ 3.6 billion at current exchange 
rates of US$I ~ 47.68 INR) in the most recent 
financial year. The Group is a US$IO billion 
Corporate Ownersfiip d Contro[ /fVo(ume 8, Issue 1, Q;a.{[2010, Continued - 4 
conglomerate with 12 steel plants in India and 2 steel 
plants in the US!\. Three key executives were 
interviewed in this company; Joint Managing 
Director, Assistant Vice President Finance and 
Genera! Manager Human Resources, 
Stcelco 2's annual report for 2008-09 addresses 
only the shareholders as the letter fi'om the Vice-
Chairman and MD starts 'Dear Shareholders'. In the 
2009 financial year, the structure of the Board of 
Directors was single-tiered and was comprised of 15 
directors of which 11 were non-Executive, Steeleo 2 
had 8 independent directors and mentions that this 
proportion is more than the stipulated 50% 
requirement. Apart fl:om the Chairman, the Yice-
Chairman and the MD, no other directors were hlmily 
mcmbers (Annual Rcport 2009: 39), Its shareholding 
pattern reveals that promoters, including family and 
group companies, hold 45.02%, ioreign institutional 
investors (Fils) hold 29.03%, banks hold 1.51 %, 
employees own 0,04%, and the public owns 9.07% of 
the total shares of 187,048,682 (I'. 51). Thus, 
ownership by banks is low, SteeJco 2's free float was 
41.25% (Business Standard, 2009). 
In regard to governance and the impact of 
regulation JMD states: 'The message we get/rom our 
management is that Hie should always /hllow all the 
rule,..,', regulations, lal1ls' and we should always be on 
the right side (d' the law. So, we have no pressure to 
do anything wrong, ever', 
Both .IMD and his colleague GMHR are of the 
view that good governance includes the aspect of 
embracing the community surrounding their finn. 
'One philosophy that our company has is that unless 
the people around you are happy, you cannot grow. 
We need to have them in with you' [GMHR]. JMD 
adds, 'this fhctOJJI and its surroundings ... we are 
married to each other. 7'lwse are the people in whose 
land this /actOl:J! has come up. We have to deal with 
them evelY dr{V and they have to deall1'ith liS. Some (!l 
them have got bene/it out (~f'it; some q/them have not 
gO! bene.fit out it, Those who have got hene.fit I~v 
direct emph~}'ment, or indirect employmem, or 
contructs, or suppliers, are line. /Jut, there are many 
others who have 110t gO! hene.fit. Ollr responsihility is 
towards them also '. JMD highlights the crucial 
interdependency of the finn and its community, 
According to him, when the firm supports the 
surrounding community irrespective of whether they 
arc its employees or nOl, the goodwil! in turn provides 
a protective moat for the firm, 'And that re,sponsihili(y 
(supporting the commlmi(v) is a requirement. It is not 
something to talk ahout, That is the ba.,,.ic need to run 
this organisation. 1/ you have good relations with 
them, nothing will go wrong. , He cites instances of 
how their firm avoided strikes and lock-outs due to 
this strong positive relationship, A VP also sums up 
the broad approach ofStee1co2 to this principle, 'Our 
management has this outlook, that ((' we introduce 
something to the industlY, we introduce something/or 
the socieO
' 
and something to the nation too, We (the 
firm) have to take care qf the local people, the 
community. q/ course, there is the government. But, 
government cannol give to evel:vbo{~V' This is the way 
we are looking at it '. 
JMD further links governance to sustainability: 
'(/ we have good c0/1}omte governance the company 
will not go into liquidation overnight '. 
Case 4: Allll1lillilllllCO. Similar to Steeleol and 
Stecleo2, Aluminiumco is part of a diversified, non-
ferrous metals and mining group established in 1979, 
The Group is listed on the London Stock Exchange 
and has reported revenues in cxcess of US$6,6 billion 
for the year ending 31 March 2009, Aluminiumco is 
based in South India and was established in 1995, It 
reported gross revenue of Rs5083.35 million 
(approximately US$I06 million) in the most recen1 
financial year. Two key executives were interviewed 
in this company, the Company Secretary and I-lead 
Legal, and Associate CSR Manager. 
Aluminiumco's Chairman's report docs not 
address anyone in particular and begins by stating the 
company's vision. In the 2008 financial year, the 
Board of Directors was single-tiered with Executive 
and non-Executive members. Of the total of 8 
members, 2 were executive directors and the 
remaining 6 were non-executive members, Three 
were independent professional directors. The 
shareholding paltern reveals that a foreign body 
corporate classified under promoter group holds 80% 
of the total shares, with 0% of Indian promoters, FIls 
own 6.14%, banks have 0% ownership, and the total 
institutional shareholding is 6,36%. The non-
institutional shareholders comprise bodies corporate, 
individual shareholders (4.5%), OCBs, and non-
resident Indians (NRIs), with total shares of 
22,500,000 (company website, p. 54). Thus, banks 
have no ownership or role, Aluminiumco's free float 
was 20% (Business Standard, 2009). 
The principles-based approach of the Indian 
governance system elucidated by OileD and Steeleo 
respondents is also confirmed by this finn. CSL 
observes, 'The Tata Group, who started 100 years 
ago, . have built excellent institutes like Tata Institute 
(~/ Social Sciences ... Even the Birla Group was vel)' 
pioneering and they have set up institutions. many 
schools ... many institutes, temples, planetariums, and 
this was all voluntmy. 111ere was no law which says 
that you have to ,spend on cOlporate social 
responsibility. Social responsibiliz), qf a business 
entity Ivas always in the minds q/ the old bwdness 
hOllses, The notion that we have earned so much and 
we should go and give if back to the socieo' was 
already there bit! now I think we have a more 
structured ,)),stem', He adds, 'voluntarily we have 
accepted the United Nations Global Compact 
Principles. We believe that governance is something 
lhal should corne volunta)'i~)I. It is going beyond the 
rules. This is our philosophy', His colleague, ACSR 
observes, 'whether you call it ('"'SR, or whether you 
call it philanthropy, it doesn't mat/er. What matters is 
, " 
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that when you have the capacity to take somebody 
with yo/.(, 1 think you should do it '. 
The value system based on stewardship 
emanated yet again from the Indian culture and 
ideologies articulated by Gandhi. 'We believe that 
trust ... the concept q( trusteesl7lI) given by Gandhiji 
means that the management qlthe company is trustee 
of (he shareholders' [CSL]. 
CSL stresses the stakeholder perspective of the 
firm. 'For liS, the employees are one ql the most 
important stakeholders; the government too is 
another important stakeholder'. ACSR explains this 
perspective further. 'I look at it this wqy, the emph~)iee 
.fin(1/~J! goes into the community. So doing it (we((are 
activiOe.s) for the employee or the cOI11//1uniO', one 
s/7ouldn '!make too strong a demarcation between the 
two'. 
Another line of rcsponding about 'good 
governance' was the link shown here by CSL: 
'cOljJorate governance is more ql an ethical issue 
where ultimate~y a good governed company will 
certain(v be rewarded by the stakeholders .J say that 
cO/parate governance can also bring p/"(~/its. And 
also hring value. It takes years to build a good name 
but it takes seconds to ,spoil if. So at the same time it's 
not easy. You have to be really on your toes as people 
are watching. EvCl:v employee should imbibe this 
culture '. 
Case 5: TextilemachinelYco. 
Textilemachineryco was founded in 1962 and designs, 
develops and exports a range of textile machinery. 
This company is the smallest in the sample used for 
this study. Based in South India, it reported revenues 
of Rs13380lJ9 lakhs (approximately US$280 
million) for the financial year ending in 2009, One 
key executive was interviewed in this company. The 
Company Secretary was interviewed for this case. 
Textilemachineryco's director's report (p. 42) 
addresses only shareholders as 'Dear Shareholders'. 
In the 2008 financial year, the Board of Directors was 
single-tiered with Executive and non-Executive 
members. Of the total of8 members, 2 were executive 
directors and the remaining 6 were non-executive 
mcmbcrs, and included an institutional nominee 
representing the insurance segment. Three were 
independent professional directors. Thc shareholding 
pattern for the 2009 financial year reveals that an 
Indian body corporate classified under Indian 
promoters holds 23,37% of the total shares, with 0% 
foreign promoters, FIls own 0.31 %. banks have 
0.02% ownership and insurance companies hold 
18.18%, with the total institutional shareholding at 
22.20%. The non-institutional shareholders comprise 
52% of total shareholders and include bodies 
corporate (15.11%), individual shareholders 
(19,74%), and OCBs (13.19%), with total shares of 
12,369,250 (company website). The company's 
shares were listed on the Madras Stock Exchange 
also. Textilcmachincryco's hee float was 74.19% 
(Business Standard, 2009). 
Similar to other interviewed busincsses, 
Textilemachineryco's CS cxplains that thc founder 
had instituted the culture or good governance well 
beforc the formal rules and regulations. "Actual()I the 
corporate governance concept and corporate 
commillees were appointed five or six years back . 
But, even before that we were practising all this, 
although it was not published in our annual reports. 
The (company) founder was responsible .fiJI' this 
ethical way (~( conducting the business. This culture 
thaI is in practice now in our company has been 
imbibed at the velY beginning itsefl". 
Similarly, CS describes the principles-based 
governance practices followed by the linn voluntarily 
and proactively without the necessity of legislation. 
'COI]Jorate governance as Ive understand is total 
sati,y(action q( all the stakeholders - the shareholders. 
the promoters, the suppliel:\', the customers, the 
workCl:s', that is, our employees, all these people who 
are connected with and working with the 
organization. Yes, all these things were in our 
business routines, even bqlore it was made 
compulsOlY, or mandated as law. Voluntari~}' we have 
been in compliance with these reqUirements '. 
Due to its best practice governance standards, 
Textilemachineryco has become a role model Jor 
several finns, similar to Stee!coL 'Many companies 
fhllow our model'. CS explains onc aspect of the 
model is the principle of not taking advantage of the 
firm's superior market position to exploit others. 
'Ours is a monopo~y. Even though we are a 
monopoly, we don't treat our customers that way. 
When there is a lot (~l demand suddenly, we don'r 
raise the prices. Another thing is, ;;1 whatever we do, 
11/e do }lot discrbninate hetween customers - the small 
players or the big customers. Whatever the size q/the 
order, we quote the same price. Further, we have a 
queue (\ystem) fbI' delivelY. we never by-pass the 
queue. Whatever be the case, nofavouritism is shown. 
Although we have our own group companies Ive don't 
give preference to any qlour group companies. T1wv 
should also stand in the queue. Even the foreign 
competitors are unable 10 compete with liS hecause q( 
these principles '. 
The findings arc summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Summary of findings 
Variables .Anglo-S~xon sy§tem ~ontinent~l system 
Legal system Strong legal structure 
but weak enforcement 
All 5 companies 
I. The Companies Act, 1956 
2. Companies Bill, 2004 
3. Securities Contracts 
(Regulation) Act, 1956, 
4. Securities and Exchange Board 
of India Act, 1992 
5. Depositories Act, 1996 
/bySEBlI 
6. Right to Information Act 
2005 [relevant for the PSU 
firm] 
Fifteen International regulations 
and Codes published fi'om 1992 -
2008 
Concentration of ownership and Aluminiumco had the highest 
equity by a single shareholder concentration (Foreign corporate 
(promoters in all 5 cases) bodies: 80%) 
Oileo (Government: 51%) 
Steeleo 2 (45%) 
Steelco I (34%) 
Textilemachineryco had the lowest 
concentration (23%) 
ilnportance of the stock market 
India lies between USA and Europe - sec Table 1 
Role/control by banks Aluminiumco (0%) Steeleo I (19.82%) 
Textilemaehineryeo (0.02%) 
Oileo (0.12%) 
Steel co 2 (1.51%) 
. --_ ... _ ... _----
Structure ofihe Board of Single "- Tiered: Two-Tiered: 
Directors, and total members in Steeleo 2 (15 directors; 4 Exec) Oileo (11 directors; 5 Exec) 
the board Aluminiumco (8 directors; 2 Exec) Steeleo I (14 directors; 6 Exec) 
Textilemachineryco (8 directors; 2 
Exec) 
Extent oftJ'ee float (%) Anglo- Saxon systems have fi'ee Continental systems have free float 
float of> 55% of< 55% 
Steeleo I (66.05%) Aluminiumco (20%) 
Textilemachineryco (74.19%) Steelco 2 (41.25%) 
Oileo (48.89%) 
Discussion 
In relation to the strength of the legal system, we 
expected that the Indian corporate governance system 
would more closely resemble the due to the presence 
of extensive regulations. However, data reveals 
hybridization. White there is an extensive body of 
regulations, they arc weakly enforced, What accounts 
for the hybridization? Typically, the Ang!o-Saxon 
system treats the legal rules and ethical customs of the 
society as external constraints to shareholder value 
maximisation, while the continental system includes 
legal rules and ethical customs in the stakeholder loss 
minimisation objective (Alpaslan, 2009). The 
inclusion of rules in the stakeholder objective has 
stemmed from the societal culture and ethical values 
, .' f NTF:RPRRSS 1~-!!i!'..(!s. ~--
44' 
C01poraLe OU!1ltrsfiip r1 Contro( /'/Jo[ume 8, is.we 1, (Far[ 2010, COl/tin Ilea - 4 
of Ihe founders. For inslance. Ihe best praclice 
governance practices that ACS refers to in the 
in terview, included: 8 hour shifts and bOil uses which 
were made mandatory much later; establishing a 
creche for children of employees; more recently, 
establishing a whistleblower policy that is 110t 
mandatory but is an option in Clause 49 regulation; 
engaging in a new initiative of holding AGM's !lot 
only in the headquarters of the firm but also in 
different cities so as to benefit the retail shareholders 
who cannot travel; and improvements in investor 
relations by attempting to locate individual 
shareholders with unclaimed monies with the finn, 
and sending them their money instead of simply 
following the rule of sending unclaimed monics to the 
Government. A wider view of stakeholders tlwll wlwt 
is legHlly req uired or traditionally seen ill (\ 
stakeholder model is evident . along with a community 
'()cus. This appears to be the difTerent ' normative 
core' of a stakeholder model as observed by Alpaslan 
(2009). 
But, the presence ofcolTuption in the society and 
hlCk of enforcement of the rules stemming from 
unethical behavior also exists simultaneously as 
pointed out by CMD. The World Bank's CO ROSC 
for India (2004) identified regulatory arbitrage as the 
main reason for this weakness of the governance 
system. It stated that the 'Department of Company 
Affairs (DCA), SEBI and the stock exchanges share 
jurisdiction over listed companies. This creates a 
potential for regulatory arbitrage and weakens 
enioreement' (I'. 15). Fremond and Capaul in (2002: 
2) in their survey of 15 countries observed that poor 
enforcement was a result of under-financed courts 
who arc ulllllotivated and unci car as to how the law 
appl ies, un fami liar with economic issues, or even 
corrupt; and, securi ties regulators who have little 
direct power to enforce penalties. 
In examining the importance of the stock market 
we expected that India with its tradition of rules 
would accord a high importance to the stock market. 
However the data points to hybridization yet (lgain 
with the importance of the Indian stock market placed 
betwcen the Amcricas and the Spanish exchanges. 
In evaluating the presence of a sigll ificant 
shareholder, the tradition of family-bHscd finns in 
India would imply the presence of a singlc, large 
shareholder or promoter having H high degree of 
influence thus adhering more closely to the 
Continental system. The data supports this. The 
sharcholding data from the Annual Reports rcvcal~ 
that all five finns had a strong concentration of equity 
held by promoters, rang ing fi·oJl1 80% in 
Aluminiul11co, to 23% in Textilcmachineryco. The 
data further reveals that the founders had a high 
degree of influence on their organization's corpora I.e 
governance practices. 
As (0 the shareholding pattern, India's pro!lloter-
based holding patterns would mean a low free float 
factor as typicaJly found in Continental systems. The 
datll confi rms that the free float factor is very 10'\' 1"01' 
all five firms. thereby revea ling similHrities to the 
Cont incnta l governance system. 
In comparing systems we have also (Irgucd that 
the Anglo-Saxon system exhibit's (I low level of 
control by banks on the Boards of finns. Indian 
businesses with their low bank debt implying low 
control by banks provide similaritics to the Anglo-
Saxon system. Data confirms the resemblance of the 
Indian governance system to the Anglo-Saxon system. 
as only one finn had approximately 20% ownership 
by banks, while the remaining fOllr firms had 0% to 
2% ownership. 
finally, the assumption of extensive regulations 
implies a single-tier board with a high proportion of 
independent directors, typical of an Anglo-Saxon 
system. Data points to hybridization as the smnplc 
firms exhibit both single-ticred boards, as wel1 as two-
tiered boards. The number of board members also 
exhibi ts the presence of a mixed systclll. Those finns 
using a single-ticr structure, however, d isph-lycd 
greater director independence. 
TIle Indian bybrid corporate governance model 
is portrayed in Figure 2. It demonstrates thnt the 
hybridization has evolved not only through a 
combination of characteristics from both the Anglo-
Saxon and Continental systems, but also due to the 
cOLintry-specific culture, values, ideologies and 
religioLis faith. 
, . 
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Figure 2: Indian Hybrid Corporate Governance System 
A case of mix-and-match? 
Anglo-Saxon Corporate Continental Corporate Governance Governance System Indian Culture, System 
-Outsider values, ideologies 
-Insider 
-Market-based Political orientation 
CONTROL MECHANISM: Socialism CONTROL MECHANISM: 
Enforcement of Regulations Strength of Relationships 
Shareholder focus Stakeholder focus 
Dispersed body of investors Single large shareholder 
Shareholder is the only Multiple stakeholders 
stake older Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Long-tenn due to Cross-
Short-term relationships shareholding & Interlocking 
Agency problems Directorships 
Fewer agency problems 
Weak enforcement of 
Legal and RegulatOryQ Regulations 
approach 
Principles-based approach 
Importance of stock market-
Medium 
Extensive disclosures 
Strict trading rules 
Liquid stock markets 
Importance of stock market - High Limited free float Importance of stock market - Low 
Extensive disclosures Banks not represented on Board ~ Less fluid stock markets Strict trading rules "L--
Liquid stock marke~ 
Concluding remarks 
A cycle has been in motion since the collapse of 
Enron where corporate governance failures have led 
to increased regulation; a new loophole in the 
regulation is exploited leading to addit ional 
governance lapses, wh ich in turn prompts furth er 
regulation. However, what we have failed to notice is 
the poss ibility of the existence of a virtuous cycle in 
reverse: exemplary corpora te governance practices 
being mandated as law and the birth of best practices 
cont inuing to become a regulation. This is evident 
from this study, albei t a very small sample. This 
aspect requires further research using larger samples. 
Exit is costly 
Limited free float 
Banks represented on Board 
What does India 's future corporate governance system 
look like? The study highlights that corporate 
governance systems evolve and change as firm s 
engage in proactive or reactive pract ices. For the large 
Indian business groups, PSUs and other private firms 
which had been following best practice principle-
based governance practi ces, it seems to be merely a 
matter of reporting and disclos ing what they had been 
doing all along. The public became aware of these 
firm s' exemplary practices. Thus, the regulations and 
disclosure policies benefited them. However, the 
interview data hints that smaller private [inns may 
have a ditTerent governance system. The comment 
links profits to cheating. The scope of this study was 
limited to large listed companies and business groups. 
, . 
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A wider sample that includes smaller private firms 
and unaffiliated firms will provide data that can be 
general ized. 
As Thyi l and Young (2009) observed, ''1ft er 
India's independence in i 947, cOlporate governance 
praclices in india were modelled on the values and 
philosophy q/ India 's political leaders, Mahatma 
Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, who instilled in the 
public mind the concepts 0/ "trusteeship" and social 
jllslice'. All five fi rms reported that CSR activities 
were a part of their good governance agenda. This 
approach slemmed from the principle of 'giving back 
to the society'. The data high lights that the firms have 
traditiona ll y encompassed several stakeholders, 
included CSR as part of good governance, and 
voluntarily embraced a principle-cenh'ed approach. 
Clear ly, this wide stakeholder embrace has benefi tted 
the firms by providing them with the stability and 
security needed for sustainable business, and 
exhibited beneficial flow-on effects to the general 
public in the vicinity of the firm, and th e local 
govcrnment, forgi ng a bond between the finn and its 
surroundings. It could be regarded that these finns' 
exemplary practices include proactive disclosures, 
community re lations and green management that are 
yet to be mandated by laws, a continuous 
improvement in transparency of their processes and 
enhanced equity and justice. Thus, as pointed out by 
severa l researchers (see West, 2009), it is also 
necessary to understand the fundamental sets of 
val ues, attitudes, and beliefs that underpin Ind ia 's 
legal and economic structures so as to identify the 
' appropriate ' governance structures fo r India and 
gauge the effectiveness of the hybrid system. 
There does not appear to be one-best-way with 
the inherent flexibi lity in the approach provided by 
the principles-based approach. As Nestor and 
Thompson (200 I : 37) observed, although 
convergence is occurring in corporate governance due 
to the g loba lization of financial and product markets, 
one should not expect uniform corporate governance 
institutions and alTangements throughout the wor ld, 
because ownership and control structures emanate 
from the particular society's core characteristics, and, 
hence, will remain idiosyncratic to a considerable 
degree. Also, as observed by Yoshikawa and Rasheed 
(2009), a comparative study of hybrid practices in 
different countries is also needed to provide insight 
into whether convergence is inevitable or not. 
This paper has revealed India's home-grown 
corporate governance system and the extent and 
nature of hybridization within the system. The 
interview data in particular has explored statements 
around va lues and estab lished practices, thereby 
highlighting the explicit culture and norms of Indian 
(irms. As West (2009) argued, 'corporate governance 
models worldwide should be mapped according to 
culture, rather than the legal system, for a more 
accurate and useful picture' as the evolution of 
country-specifi c governance is ' path dependent '. This 
paper in exploring a set of large established firms 
highlights the interdependencics of the legal systems , 
va lues, culture and norms in governance leading to a 
particular set of governance pract ices, ownership 
structures and organisational purpose. 
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